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The claim that consciousness is propositional has be widely debated in 
the past. For instance, it has been discussed whether consciousness is 
always propositional, whether all propositional consciousness is 
linguistic, whether propositional consciousness is always articulated, 
or whether there can be non-articulated propositions. In contrast, the 
question of whether propositions are conscious has not very often 
been the focus of attention. 
 
In this paper, we would like to render two ideas plausible and defend 
them against certain objections that have been raised against them. 
The first, perhaps less controversial idea is that at least certain 
propositional mental states - such as judgements, thoughts or felt 
desires - involve a particular kind of consciousness, which has often 
been called phenomenal or qualitative consciousness. The second and 
more important, since far more controversial, idea is that propositions 
- and concepts as their constituents - possess distinct and specific 
phenomenal characters, or qualia, in virtue of which they are 
experienced differently when entertained or held in thought. 
 
Both claims, we shall see, have immediate consequences on our 
conception of understanding and communication. Contrary to a 
widespread view, a view which has its roots in the linguistic turn, we 
maintain that phenomenal quality is constitutive of the understanding 
and grasping of meanings. 
 
1. Phenomenal consciousness and propositional states 
Franz Brentano (Brentano 1924), and many authors after him (Block 
1995; Rosenthal 1986 & 1997; Carruthers 2000), have noted that the 
notion of consciousness is ambiguous. One particular contrast which 
they have drawn is that between the intentionality of mental states - 
our being conscious of and directed at objects (understood in a wide 
sense) - and their phenomenology - their being phenomenally 
conscious to, or experienced by, us in a certain way.1 
 
Assume that I judge that p: in which sense am I then conscious of p? 
To judge that p is an intentional state: it is a mental state which is 
directed at some object or another. If my judgement is directed at the 
proposition p, then I am conscious of that proposition in the sense 
that I am intentionally directed at it, by means of my judgement. But 
is this the only, or even the main way, in which judgements or other 
mental states are conscious? What does it really mean to be 
intentionally conscious of something? After all, it seems possible to be 
unconsciously directed at something: we seem to be able to 
unconsciously fear, or desire, something; and there may be beings 
                                                 
1 Brentano, for instance, distinguishes between "primary" and "secondary" 
consciousness. The former consists in the intentional directedness towards some object 
(understood in a wide sense) and presupposes - but does not itself generate - the 
latter, which in contrast is responsible for the mental act being conscious of itself in a 
particular way (cf. Brentano 1924: 141ff.; 1968: 1-21). It is a matter of debate how 
exactly Brentano describes and explains the "secondary" form of consciousness (cf. Bell 
1990: 9ff.; Brandl 1992/3); but here, it suffices to focus on the phenomenon he was 
getting at - that is, phenomenal consciousness. 
with primitive intentional states to which we might not want to ascribe 
consciousness. It therefore appears that fears and desires involve 
something else than mere intentionality when we consciously 
experience them, and it seems at least possible that, likewise, 
judgements may possess this further form of consciousness, in 
addition to their directedness at propositions. 
 
To understand what kind of consciousness this additional feature of 
mental states may be, consider the case of sensations, such as pain 
experiences. It is usually (though not universally) accepted to speak 
of the phenomenal character of such mental states; whereby the 
phenomenal character is typically taken to consist in the way in which 
the respective states are experienced. For instance, a person who is in 
a state of pain, has a certain feeling or experience: there is a specific 
way of how it is, or feels like for her to be in pain.2 Experiences of 
pain are phenomenally conscious in this particular sense. Sensory 
perceptions, on the other hand, are phenomenally conscious in virtue 
of something being presented to us in a specific way: when we see 
something, it appears to us in a certain way.3 Thus, the letter M may 
be presented to the subject either as an ‘M’, or as a sigma turned 
onto its side; a certain depiction may seem at one time to be of a 
duck, and at another to be of a rabbit; and the glass to my left is 
experienced by me to be a certain way, while a patient with blindsight 
may experience it very differently, or not at all. 
 
There are philosophers who are sceptical of the idea of phenomenal 
consciousness (cf. Dennett 1988). Much more common seems to be 
the attempt to reduce phenomenal consciousness to other kind of 
consciousness (cf. Tye 1995; Dretske 1995). Here we will, however, 
not be concerned with the project of reducing or eliminating 
phenomenal consciousness to other forms of consciousness, but only 
with the following, more specific issues. First, assuming that 
phenomenal consciousness exists, is it reasonable to ascribe it to 
mental states that have propositions as their content? And second, if 
this turns out to be reasonable, do these states possess qualitative 
aspects that are specific enough to distinguish them from other states 
that involve different concepts and propositions? It is thereby 
important to note that a positive answer to the first question does not 
imply a positive one to the second. That is, while one can remain 
sceptical with respect to the existence of very specific phenomenal 
characters of judgements and other propositional states, one may 
nevertheless allow for them to be phenomenally conscious in virtue of 
a broader qualitative character (e.g., one that all judgements share 
because of their common attutide towards their respective 
propositions). 
 
These questions arise since the scope of phenomenal consciousness is 
usually restricted to a certain group of mental phenomena, mainly 
those of a sensory nature, as discussed above. For, in contrast to 
sensations and perceptions, many intentional states do not seem to 
                                                 
2 Cf. the common talk, introduced by Thomas Nagel, of "something it is like to be..." 
(cf. Nagel 1974). Even a naturalist such as Carruthers adopts this way of speaking (cf. 
Carruthers 2000: 13ff.). 
3 Again, this manner of speaking is accepted by philosophers of fundamentally different 
opinions (cf. Carruthers 2000; 241ff.; Siewert 1998: 86). 
involve phenomenal consciousness: in particular mental dispositions 
or standing conditions, such as prejudices, beliefs or desires. These 
states may manifest themselves in the shape of phenomenally 
conscious experiences, feelings or thoughts. But it appears that they 
need not do so (at least not during the whole, or even most of the, 
period of their existence); and they do not seem to involve any 
phenomenal qualities on their own, that is, in their non-manifest 
state, without the mediation of phenomenally conscious experiences, 
feelings or thoughts.4 
 
The first question may be answered very briefly. It concerns the issue 
of whether judgements, manifest beliefs and similar occurrent 
thoughts are phenomenally conscious, or whether they are rather 
more like mental dispositions or unconscious states. To answer this 
question it should suffice to take a look at two of the features of the 
propositional states under consideration. First, just like experiences 
and feelings, they seem to be part of what has been called the 
"stream of consciousness": they occur in our minds and disappear 
again, and they alternate with, or accompany, sensations, perceptions 
and feelings. Second, they can be introspected; in particular, we can 
tell when they occur in our mind and of what kind they are. In respect 
to both features judgements and similar propositional states differ 
strictly from mental dispositions; and both features strongly suggest 
that the former are phenomenally conscious. On the one hand, 
"stream of consciousness" appears to be only a different name for 
what people have in mind when they speak of "phenomenal 
consciousness": for a mental state to occur in the mind simply means 
for it to be phenomenally conscious. And on the other hand, it seems 
widely accepted that the features of mental states that we can 
introspect are - if not exclusively, then at least primarily - their 
phenomenal ones. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the 
propositional states in question are themselves experienced: there is 
something it is, or feels, like to be in or have them; or they present 
things as appearing in a certain way. Indeed, it seems plausible to 
maintain that judgements and other occurrent thoughts play a role in 
the manifestation of mental dispositions, rather than that they are 
dispositional themselves. It appears, for instance, that we sometimes 
acquire, entertain and revise our beliefs by means of judgements. 
 
But there is a further source of support for the idea that at least some 
propositional states are phenomenally conscious. Imagine two people 
listening to the news on a French radio programme. One of them - 
let's call him Jack - speaks only English, while the other - Jacques - 
speaks only French. Galen Strawson, in whose writings this particular 
example can be found, asks whether Jacques, who understands what 
the newsspeaker is saying, has an experience of a different kind than 
Jack, who merely hears the French-sounding words without grasping 
their meaning (cf. Strawson 1994: 5-6). 
 
                                                 
4 This has led philosophers (e.g., Wittgenstein) to distinguish between mental episodes 
- that is, mental states which are phenomenally conscious, such as perceptions, 
sensations, feelings and, presumably, judgements or thoughts - and mental 
dispositions, or standing conditions - that is, mental states which are not phenomenally 
conscious, such as beliefs, desires, prejudices or emotions. According to this distinction, 
the latter become phenomenally consious only if they manifest themselves by means of 
the former. 
If so - and it indeed seems intuitively plausible -, there are 
experiences of understanding which are significantly different from the 
mere auditory perceptions of the sounds produced by a voice (or from 
mere visual perceptions of signs while reading). As Strawson writes: 
"There is [...] something it is like for you to read and understand 
these words" (ibid.: 10).  
This insight alone, he points out, does not force us to accept that 
understanding is a deliberate, goal-directed action; nor does it imply 
that each experience of understanding is characterised by a distinct 
qualitative nature. But his fundamental conclusion - that we have 
phenomenally conscious experiences of understanding - suggests that 
there are propositional states which possess some qualitative aspects. 
For grasping the meaning of what someone has said surely involves 
some states which are directed at propositions - namely states which 
have propositions, that correspond to the expressed meaning, as their 
intentional objects. Hence, experiences of understanding seem to be 
both propositional and consciously experienced. 
 
It therefore remains to answer the second question: whether 
judgements and similar states possess specific phenomenal characters 
that distinguish them from each other and are at least as fine-grained 
as their propositional contents. And in what follows, we would like to 
argue that this question is best answered positively. As a matter of 
fact, most proponents of the existence of phenomenal consciousness 
would in contrast provide a negative answer. But they could not easily 
avoid giving an answer at all because of their own positive stance 
towards phenomenal consciousness in general: the issue of whether 
propositional states possess specific qualitative characters, and which 
role these characters play, arises once one has generally grown 
sympathetic towards the idea of phenomenal consciousness.5 
 
This question becomes relevant also in the light of two other 
discussions. Some philosophers believe that the intentional content of 
phenomenally conscious experiences is partly, or even fully, 
determined by their phenomenal character. Since judgements (and 
similar states) possess an intentional content, it becomes interesting 
for these philosophers to know whether judgements show a specific 
phenomenal character, and if so, whether their claim about 
experiences is also true of judgements (i.e., that the content of the 
latter is likewise determined by their qualitative character). As 
mentioned at the beginning there has also been a debate about 
whether all conscious states - including sensations and perceptions - 
are propositional . If this were true, and it would turn out that 
propositional states do not possess a specific phenomenal character, 
the result would be a rather untenable position, according to which 
experiences of pain and colours would not show any distinctive 
qualitative character. Hence, proponents of both the claim, that the 
intentional content of mental states is somehow determined by their 
phenomenal character, and the claim, that all conscious states are 
propositional, should focus their attention on the issue raised in this 
paper. 
                                                 
5 Only a few philosophers have recently discussed the issue of the phenomenal 
character of propositional states, among them Brian Loar (unpluplished), John Searle 
(1992), Owen Flanagan (1993), Galen Strawson (1994), Horgan & Tienson (2002) and, 
especially, Charles Siewert (1998). 
 
2. The first consideration: the phenomenal differences 
between thoughts 
The first source of support for the idea that there is a specific 
qualitative character of propositional states is the idea that we can tell 
apart our judgements, manifest beliefs, desires, and so on, by means 
of introspection. We can tell, say, whether our current thoughts are 
about the fog in Ivrea, or about some features of the Himalaya; and 
we can tell whether they involve the endorsement of the respective 
states of affairs as really obtaining, or as to be brought about, or 
whether we instead consider the relevant propositions neutrally, that 
is, without any evaluation or commitment. Furthermore, it is widely 
accepted that we do not have to observe our behaviour or ask other 
people in order to discover what we are currently thinking, judging or 
longing for; it simply suffices to introspect our actual state of mind to 
find out. 
 
But it seems equally plausible to assume that what we introspect of 
mental states are their phenomenal features. First of all, both how it 
is like to be in a certain mental state or to undergo a certain 
experience, and how things appear or present themselves to us, seem 
to be accessible to us in introspection. For, again, we do not need to 
observe ourselves in other ways (e.g., by means of our senses), or to 
talk to other people, in order to come to know such facts. And then, 
the qualitative features appear to constitute the bulk, if not the 
totality, of those features of mental states that we actually can access 
by means of introspection.  
 
Both these considerations path the way for the conclusion that the 
introspectible differences between the propositional states in question 
have to be manifest in their respective phenomenal characters; and 
hence that these states possess such characters which are at least as 
specific as their intentional contents. Of course, one could challenge 
this line of reasoning by arguing that there are other, non-
phenomenal features that are given in introspection and can 
distinguish the different propositional states from each other. But it is 
not clear at all what kind of features these could be. Since it also 
seems untenable to deny the fact that we can introspect such 
differences, the conclusion put forward appears to be difficult to 
avoid. 
 
3. The second consideration: the role of phenomenal 
consciousness in linguistic understanding 
But even if one is not convinced by the initial force of this argument, 
there is another, more complex reasoning that supports the same 
conclusion and is founded on perhaps less controversial premises. It 
does not concern the introspection of our own mental states, but 
instead the experience of understanding the linguistic expressions of 
other people. Its main ingredient is thus a theory of verbal 
expression, understanding and communication. This theory, we should 
emphasise, was first put forward by Edmund Husserl, the founder of 
phenomenology (for more on this see Soldati 1994 & 2000).  
 
If we want to speak, that is, express ourselves verbally, we have to 
produce complex sounds with our voice. Now, according to the theory 
under consideration, the difference between an articulated utterance 
of words or sentences and the mere generation of meaningless 
sounds is that only the former is produced by the speaker as the 
expression of one of her mental states, such as one of her thoughts or 
judgements. It is this particular relation to an underlying mental state 
which provides verbally produced sounds with a meaning and thus 
turns them into speech that expresses the mental state in question. 
 
Conventions, it is true, play a crucial role in fixing the meaning of a 
word in public language over a certain period of time. But most 
linguistic conventions are far from explicit; they are rather the product 
of an equilibrium reached by the interaction of different agents with 
different goals, beliefs and behaviours, linguistic and other. But even 
if explicit, without mental states to start from, conventions, 
normatively binding linguistic rules, would hardly get off the ground. 
 
To understand the meaning of an utterance we hear or read we have 
to have some kind of access to the mental state it expresses. Of 
course, this access can go wrong and we can misunderstand each 
other. But, as the theory claims, any attempt to understand someone 
else's speech nevertheless presupposes that one somehow represents 
certain mental states of the speaker as those which are expressed by 
his speech and hence render his utterances meaningful. Grasping the 
meaning of a linguistic expression therefore simply means to have an 
access to the expressed mental state. And since understanding 
someone does not only require to recognize that he has meant 
something by his utterance, but also what he has meant, 
understanding the meaning of a linguistic expression has to involve an 
access to the particular nature of the expressed mental state and, in 
particular, of its intentional content. 
 
Now, as the example above of Jack and Jacques has already made 
plausible, linguistic understanding is (at least in most cases) a 
consciously experienced process. There is a subjective, qualitative 
difference between merely hearing certain sounds and understanding 
them as having a specific meaning, that is, as expressing a certain 
thought. But if understanding is generally speaking a consciously 
experienced process, the question arises whether it involves a specific 
phenomenal character: that is, whether our experiences of 
understanding differ phenomenally in respect to which particular 
meanings are grasped. We grasp distinct expressed meanings by 
recognizing distinct underlying intentional states. Hence, what is really 
at issue is whether we consciously experience the differences that 
characterize the specific ways in which we recognize different mental 
states as being expressed by certain utterances. That there has to be 
a difference between our different recognitions should be obvious 
since we can, with their help, understand different linguistic 
meanings; the question is rather whether these differences among our 
recognitional states are phenomenally conscious. 
 
We think that the best way of explaining these differences - and how 
we come to grasp what other people mean by their linguistic 
utterances - is indeed by postulating such a form of phenomenal 
consciousness. And a positive answer to this question entails the 
acceptance of the existence of conceptual qualia - that is, of specific 
phenomenal characters of states with propositional content. Qualia 
are concerned in so far as consciously experienced, phenomenal 
aspects of mental states are concerned. And they are conceptual since 
the intentional contents of these states possess a propositional and 
hence conceptual content. The latter observation has already been 
made above: we have to be in some kind of propositional state in 
order to be able to grasp a linguistic meaning, since this kind of 
meaning shows itself a propositional, and conceptual, structure. In the 
remainder of the paper, we would like to show the plausibility of this 
idea - that specific conceptual qualia play an important role in 
linguistic understanding - and defend it against certain common 
objections. 
 
But before that, it is necessary to formulate some qualifications about 
the thesis under consideration in order to clarify the scope of the 
argument and to prevent possible misunderstandings. First, it is 
important to note that the example of Jack and Jacques alone is not 
sufficient to shed more light on the phenomenal nature of the 
experience of understanding; it merely supports the claim that there 
is a qualitative difference between understanding and not 
understanding something. The idea that understanding involves 
specific conceptual qualia requires more support than the idea that 
experiences of understanding have some qualitative character.  
Second, it is not at issue whether all propositional states possess a 
specific phenomenal character. Rather, we try to argue only that 
some mental states with propositional content possess a specific 
phenomenal character. In particular, we do not intend to extent our 
claim to dispositional states; after all, we are concerned with 
occurring experiences of understanding. Third, we also do not want to 
claim that all understanding must be phenomenally conscious. Angels 
- if they exist - may perhaps understand each other in a different 
way. We do not argue that phenomenal consciousness is necessary 
for understanding, but only that it is specifically relevant for the 
manner in which we human beings usually come to understand each 
other's utterances. Analogously, it is one thing to maintain that 
sensations of pain are consciously experienced by us humans; but it is 
a much stronger claim to say that there could not be pain without 
such a form of consciousness. And fourth, the qualitative character of 
experiences is introspectively accessible.  
We usually know very well how it is like for us if someone drills a hole 
into one of our teeth, or how the rails appear to us in the distance, 
and we typically do not let us be influenced by our additional 
knowledge or by what other people have to say about these issues. 
The dentist can keep on insisting that our root is dead, but this does 
not make our pain disappear. And although I know that the rails run 
parallel, they still continue to seem meet in the distance. This does 
not mean, however, that introspection cannot go wrong. And our 
considerations are also neutral with respect to particular theories of 
introspection; in particular, they do not commit us to the idea that 
introspection is a form of inner perception or observation. We only 
assume that we have introspective access to some aspects of some 
propositional states. 
 
 
4. A first objection: fallacious inferences by analogy 
The picture of communication, with which we have so far operated, 
has been criticized as naive and as facing many difficulties. Here, we 
have  space to rebut only one of the objections often put forward 
against it. We have suggested that, in order to grasp the meaning of a 
linguistic expression, it is necessary to recognize the underlying 
expressed mental state and its intentional content. But we yet have to 
say a bit more about how this recognition may come about. And 
precisely here, the following problem arises. I know, from the first 
person perspective, what pain is since I have had pain experiences. 
But when I see you showing the same behaviour that I normally show 
when I am in pain, how can I come to know, now from the third 
person perspective, that you undergo an experience that is of the 
same kind as mine? As far as I am concerned, you may have a 
completely different kind of experience (e.g., you may phenomenally 
experience it very differently). On the other hand, we usually seem to 
be able, after all, to come to know whether someone else is in pain 
solely on the basis of observing his behaviour. So how can we make 
the step from our own experiences to those of others? 
 
It has often been stressed that the problem is not so much whether 
we are justified in our assumption that our experiences are very 
similar to those of others, but rather whether our own concept of 
pain, acquired on the basis of our own experiences, could also apply 
to the experiences of others. In my case, I have acquired a concept of 
pain that I have good reason to apply to my own sensations of pain 
because of the way in which I experience them. But since I cannot 
experience the sensations that occur in your mind, when you show 
the same behaviour that I show when I am in pain, I do not have a 
good reason to assume that my concept of pain likewise applies to 
your sensations. In other words, as Wittgenstein has once written, 
what is at issue is "that I am expected to imagine experiences of pain, 
which I do not have, on the basis of experiences of pain, that I do 
have" (cf. Wittgenstein 1984: § 302). 
 
One idea that has been suggested to close the gap between knowing 
one's own and knowing other's mental states is that we come to know 
the nature of the mental states, and in particular the experiences, of 
other people by means of an inference by analogy. According to this 
"simple theory" (cf. Peacocke: 97f.), we assume that other people are 
exactly like us: if they show the same behaviour that we show when 
we feel pain, then they must feel pain as well - that is, they must 
have the same experience as us. In other words, it is said that we use 
our own case as an analogy for the case of the other person in 
question and infer accordingly from our own experiences to those of 
the other. For instance, if I know what it means for me to have tooth-
ache and observe you expressing yourself in the way in which I would 
express myself when feeling tooth-ache, I could simply conclude that 
you have the same kind of tooth- ache and hence would come to 
know what it means for you to feel this kind of pain. For I would, 
according to the "simple theory", be able to assume that you and me 
are similar in that we have the same kind of experiences and express 
them in similar ways - that we are analogous to each other. As 
Peacocke stresses, however, such a theory would be circular. It 
presupposes precisely that what it tries to prove, namely that there 
are concepts of mental states (such as pain) that apply to both my 
own and other peoples' experiences. It simply assumes that this is the 
case. That is, it does not really answer the problem identified by 
Wittgenstein, but ignores altogether its existence. 
 
Now, it might be suspected that the account of linguistic 
communication put forward by us is circular in a similar way. To see 
the possible force of this challenge, it is necessary to look a bit closer 
at how we come to recognize the mental states that others express 
linguistically. In order for the interpreter to understand the speaker's 
expression, the expressed sentence must be one that the interpreter 
might have uttered himself. Furthermore, if he would have uttered it, 
he would have himself expressed a certain mental state. The idea is 
now that the interpreter can come to know which mental state the 
speaker has expressed by coming to know which mental state he 
himself would have expressed if he would have made the same kind 
of utterance. The interpreter thus recognizes the expressed mental 
state of the speaker by putting himself in the position of the speaker, 
that is, in the position of using the utterance in question in order to 
express one of his own mental states. But even if one accepts that 
linguistic behaviour can serve us as prima facie evidence for the belief 
that the speaker intends to express a certain meaning, there still 
seems to be the problem - the objection goes - that we cannot so 
easily infer from our own mental states to those of other people, 
again because we cannot be sure whether our concepts of the former 
can likewise apply to the latter. That is, to know that you use an 
utterance, that I would use to express a belief which I can 
conceptualize myself as a belief about, say, the current weather, does 
not guantaree that I have a good reason to conceptualize the mental 
state underlying your expression in the same way. After all, there 
may not be a concept that applies to both; and I cannot simply 
assume the existence of such a concept. 
 
Using inferences from oneself to others and applying the concepts 
that capture one's own mental states to the states of the others is not 
the only way by means of which the hearer can put himself in the 
position of the speaker and recognize what he has expressed by his 
utterance. Instead, a theory of our knowledge of other minds can be 
formulated in terms of empathy, according to which a person grasps 
what is going on in someone else's mind, not by means of the 
application of mental concepts on the basis of observations, but by 
means of imagining herself to be in the position of the other person 
and grasping what is happening in her own mind as a result.6  
According to this proposal, if I hear you making a certain utterance 
and try to understand it, I imagine what it would take to make that 
utterance myself. And in order to do so, I have to imaginatively 
entertain a corresponding propositional state that could be expressed 
by the utterance in question. I come to understand what you have 
meant with your utterance simply by imaginatively entertaining that 
propositional state. Of course, I can be wrong since I may fail to 
appropriately imagine being in your position of making that utterance. 
But what is more important is that this account of how we come to 
recognize the mental states that other people express does not 
require that we conceptualize the other's mental states in any way. 
                                                 
6 Cf. Husserl 1950: § 50; Husserl 1954: § 67. 
 
For the proposal suggests that we grasp them simply by imaginatively 
entertaining them ourselves. To put it briefly, it conceives of 
communication as a very straightforward and direct way of putting 
one's own thoughts into the listener's mind. Hence, it can avoid the 
problem that the inference-by-analogy model faces. 
  
5. A second objection: the sensory aspects of thought 
When people speak of phenomenal character, they usually refer to an 
aspect of sensory experiences, such as sensations of pain or 
perceptions of colour. This might suggest the idea that thinking, 
understanding and judging possess a qualitative character only in the 
sense that they involve, or are accompanied by, some related sensory 
state. The idea is that my experience of understanding or judging that 
p is experiential only in so far as I sensorily hear or read or imagine 
the utterance "p". Some philosophers have indeed believed that the 
propositional states in question occur only in conjunction with the 
perception or imagination of signs or symbols.  
 
However, even if this were true, the phenomenal character of these 
sensory states would be only contingently linked to the content of the 
respective propositional state. For instance, that fact that we express 
in English a thought about a house by means of the symbol "house", 
and not by means of another one, is not essential to what the thought 
actually means. Therefore, the specific phenomenal character of 
thoughts and judgements - if it exists - could not be of a sensory 
kind.7 
 
Nevertheless, this kind of reasoning leaves some room for an 
objection against the thesis that propositional states possess a specific 
phenomenal character. For one could insist that the qualitative 
character of these experiences belongs exclusively to the 
accompanying sensory representations and that it is, in this sense, 
independent of their conceptual content. We often entertain symbolic, 
acoustic or diagrammatic representations, while we think, understand 
or judge something. Hence, it seems plausible to maintain that, since 
the sensory representations of such signs occur usually in conjunction 
with particular thoughts, we have the tendency to take the 
phenomenal character of the sensory representations to be a feature 
of the non-sensory thoughts. 
 
But this objection can be dealt with by making it plausible that the 
propositional states in question can, and often do, occur without the 
simultaneous presence of sensory representations of symbols or 
signs. Already Karl Bühler (1907) has argued, on the basis of an 
empirical investigation of the mental states to which we have 
introspective access while thinking, that visual, acoustic or motoric 
representations are not necessary components of thought. And 
                                                 
7 Wittgenstein writes in the Philosophical Investigations: "In the sense/in so far, that 
there are no characteristic processes/experiences (even mental processes/experiences) 
of understanding, understanding is no mental process/experience. (The increase and 
decrease of a sensation of pain, the hearing of a melody, of a sentence: mental 
processes/experiences)" (Wittgenstein (1984): § 154). Wittgenstein seems here to 
reject that understanding is a mental process/experience on the basis of the argument 
that it is not a sensory process/experience. But the argument does not address the 
possibility of there being non-sensory processes/experiences. 
Charles Siewert has, to the same effect, put forward examples of 
thoughts (e.g., one that occured in his mind while he was walking 
from his table to the till of a restaurant) that are too complex and 
appear and disappear in such an immediate way and in a brief period 
of time, that it would seem to be impossible for us to sensorily 
represent the respective sentences at the same time (cf. Siewert 
(1998): 264; 277). Finally, there are features of sensory 
representations that do not seem to occur in pure thought. For 
instance, acoustic perceptions and imaginations must have at least 
some acoustic characteristics: the represented sentence or symbol 
must possess, say, a certain volume, a certain pitch and a certain 
duration or speed. In the case of an acoustic imagination, it might not 
be necessary that all such acoustic features be present or determined, 
but it would be strange to speak of an acoustic representation, if none 
of them would occur. By contrast, it seems perfectly possible to think 
something without being conscious of any sensory feature - whether 
visual or acoustic - at all. Hence, the phenomenal character of the 
propositional states in question cannot be analysed in terms of the 
phenomenal character of possibly accompanying sensory 
representations of symbols or signs. 
 
6. A third objection: the vagueness of phenomenal characters 
One more thing remains to be made plausible, namely that the 
phenomenal character of the recognition is indeed specific enough to 
individuate the expressed mental state. It might be suspected that 
the qualitative character of thoughts or judgements is too imprecise in 
order to determine a particular intentional content.  
 
For it seems that we may not always be able, on the basis of our 
introspective access to our phenomenal consciousness, to tell for sure 
which thought we are currently having. Consider the following 
example put forward by Charles Siewert (cf. Siewert 1998: 287f.). I 
am driving to work and suddenly realize that I have left my briefcase 
at home. This realization happens by means of a conscious thought. 
But which one exactly? The thought that I have forgotten my 
briefcase? Or the thought that it still lies on my desk at home? Have I 
been thinking that I have unintentionally moved myself away from my 
briefcase? Or that I have moved while my briefcase stayed where it 
were? Has my thought involved the idea that I have left the briefcase 
where I and my family live? Or the idea that I left the thing with 
which I usually transport my books, papers and pens? When I wonder  
about the precise nature of my thought and begin to concentrate on 
how I have phenomenally experienced the thought in question, I may 
for some while consider these and similar options and accept them as 
appropriate descriptions of my thought. But when and where exactly 
will my acceptance stop? Will there be a point during my 
considerations at which I will begin to say to myself: "no, I haven't 
thought that"? As Siewert has concluded, the argument suggests that 
there is good reason to assume that there is no such clear and precise 
border (cf. Siewert 1998: 290).However, he has also argued that the 
qualitative characters are not more vague than the corresponding 
intentional contents (cf. Siewert 1998: 284ff.).  
 
Accordingly, the potential vagueness of the former does not seem to 
prevent them from being able to determine the latter. In order to see 
how this claim is supported, it is not necessary to concern oneself 
with our more or less successful transformation of thoughts into 
language. For it is not at issue whether, for instance, a particular 
utterance is the most appropriate one to express a certain thought. 
Instead, we are confronted with the question as to whether our 
mental concepts are vague  with respect to the mental states they are 
supposed to pick out. Is the concept "thinking that p", for instance, 
capable of precisely determining which thought I have been thinking  
on a certain occasion? It seems not. 
 
The problem is due neither to my inability to find the right concept to 
express my thought, nor to the possibility that my thought has no 
specific intentional content (we take it that we can assume that in 
many, if not most cases, our thoughts have determined contents). 
Rather, it is due to the nature of our concepts of intentional states 
and to the general criteria for their application.  
Althought the thought that I have forgotten the briefcase at home and 
the thought that I have left it where my family lives differ in their 
content, it is normally not possible to determine, neither by means of 
concepts of intentional states, nor by means of concepts of 
phenomenal characters, which of the two thoughts I have actually 
experienced and expressed. Consequently, there does not seem to be 
any difference with respect to vagueness between the two kinds of 
concepts. The objection that the phenomenal character is too vague 
to determine the intentional content is hence untenable. 
 
7. Conclusion 
To sum up, we have suggested that we can understand the way in 
which we understand linguistic expressions of other people in terms of 
empathy: we imaginatively entertain a propositional state that we 
would have expressed if we were in the position of the speaker, and 
thereby experience the content of the mental state that he actually 
has expressed. Furthermore, we have tried to show that, in order to 
be able to individuate the expressed mental state in this way, we have 
to fall back on a characteristic and easily accessible aspect of our own 
imaginative state, namely its specific phenomenal character. And our 
theory has also included the claim that we refer to this very same 
character, too, when we try in general to distinguish and individuate 
our own conscious mental states. One main source for the plausibility 
of our account of the role of phenomenal consciousness in thought 
and understanding has been its explanatory power: it can explain how 
we come to recognize or grasp the mental states of ourselves and 
others. The other source has been the possibility to rebut the 
challenges and objections that have been raised against accounts like 
the one that we have put forward. 
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